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Mean-field games of optimal stopping:
a relaxed solution approach
Ge´raldine Bouveret ∗ Roxana Dumitrescu † Peter Tankov ‡
Abstract
We consider the mean-field game where each agent determines the optimal time to
exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with reward function depending
on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game. We place
ourselves in the framework of relaxed optimal stopping, which amounts to looking for
the optimal occupation measure of the stopper rather than the optimal stopping time.
This framework allows us to prove the existence of the relaxed Nash equilibrium and the
uniqueness of the associated value of the representative agent under mild assumptions.
Further, we prove a rigorous relation between relaxed Nash equilibria and the notion
of mixed solutions introduced in earlier works on the subject, and provide a criterion,
under which the optimal strategies are pure strategies, that is, behave in a similar
way to stopping times. Finally, we present a numerical method for computing the
equilibrium in the case of potential games and show its convergence.
Key words: mean-field games, optimal stopping, relaxed solutions, infinite-dimensional
linear programming
MSC2010: 91A55, 91A13, 60G40
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study a large-population stochastic differential game of
optimal stopping, where each agent finds the optimal time to exit the game by solving an
optimal stopping problem with instantaneous reward function depending on the density of
the state processes of agents still present in the game. To motivate the mean-field game
(MFG) framework, we first provide a formulation with a finite number of agents. Assume
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that each agent i = 1, 2, ..., n has a private state process X i, whose dynamics is given by the
stochastic differential equation (SDE),
dX it = µ(t,X
i
t)dt+ σ(t,X
i
t)dW
i
t ,
where the Brownian motions W i, i = 1, . . . , n are independent.
The objective of each agent i is to maximize over all possible stopping times τ the reward
functional
E
[∫ τ
0
e−ρtf˜(t,X it ,m
n
t )dt+ e
−ρ(τ∧T )g(τ ∧ T,X iτ∧T )
]
,
with
mnt (dx) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δXit (dx)1t≤τ .
Agents have the same state process coefficients and objective functions, and the optimal
stopping problems are coupled only through the empirical measure mn. Since the objective
functions are coupled, it is natural to look for Nash equilibria.
Stochastic differential games with a large number n of players are rarely tractable. The
MFG approach amounts to looking for the Nash equilibrium in the limiting regime, when
the number of players n goes to infinity. Following this approach, we study the MFG of
optimal stopping, which can be seen as an infinite-agent version of the above game. In this
approach, we first solve for a fixed distribution m the optimal stopping problem
max
τ
E
[∫ τ
0
e−ρtf˜(t,Xt,mt)dt+ e−ρ(τ∧T )g(τ ∧ T,Xτ∧T )
]
,
with
dXt = µ(t,Xt)dt+ σ(t,Xt)dWt.
Then, given τm,x the optimal stopping time for the agent with initial condition x, and the
initial measure m0, we look for the family of distributions (mt)0≤t≤T such that
mt(A) =
∫
m0(dx)P[Xxt ∈ A; τm,x > t], A ∈ B(R), t ∈ [0, T ]. (1.1)
A solution (Nash equilibrium) of the MFG problem is the family of measures (mt)0≤t≤T ,
which is the fixed point of the mapping defined by the right-hand side of (1.1).
In this paper, we prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium for the MFG problem and
the uniqueness of the associated value of the representative agent. To this aim, we use the
relaxed solution approach, which converts the stochastic optimal stopping problem into a
linear programming problem over a space of measures. The decision variable is no longer
the optimal stopping time, but rather the distribution of the killed state process.
Introducing relaxed solutions facilitates existence proofs: the existence is proven by using
Fan-Glicksberg’s fixed-point theorem. The relaxed solutions are related to the mixed strate-
gies introduced in Bertucci (2017), and we establish a rigorous relation between the two.
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Finally, we propose an implementable numerical scheme for computing the Nash equilibrium
in the case of potential games, and show its convergence. An application of these results to
a resource-sharing problem will be developed in a companion paper.
MFG theory has been introduced by P.-L. Lions and J.-M. Lasry in a series of papers
(Lasry & Lions 2006a, Lasry & Lions 2006b, Lasry & Lions 2007) using an analytic approach
and studied independently at about the same time by Huang, Malhame´, Caines et al. (2006).
Later on, a probabilistic approach has been developed in a series of papers by Carmona,
Delarue, and their co-authors (Carmona & Delarue 2013, Carmona, Delarue et al. 2013,
Carmona & Delarue 2018, Carmona, Delarue, Lacker et al. 2016, Lacker 2015) and so on.
The analytic method consists in finding the Nash equilibria through a coupled system
of nonlinear partial differential equations: a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (backward
in time), which describes the optimal control problem of the representative agent when the
distribution µ is given, and a Kolmogorov-type equation (forward in time) which describes
the evolution of the density under the optimal control. In the probabilistic approach, the
system of PDEs is replaced by a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential
equations of McKean-Vlasov type.
MFGs of optimal stopping have been considered in the literature only very recently,
and our understanding of this type of games remains limited. Nutz (2018) considers a
MFG problem where the agents interact through the proportion of players that have already
stopped and each agent solves a specific optimal stopping problem of the form
sup
τ
E
[
exp
(∫ τ
0
rsds
)
1{θ>τ}∪{θ=∞}
]
.
There, the process r creates an incentive for the agent to stay in the game, while the pos-
sibility of default at a random time θ creates an incentive to leave. The distribution of θ
depends on the proportion ρt of players who have already stopped in such a way that the
departure of other agents creates an incentive for the agent under consideration to leave
as well. In a similar spirit but with greater generality, Carmona, Delarue & Lacker (2017)
consider MFGs of timing, whose formulation is motivated by a dynamic model of bank run
in a continuous time setting. As in Nutz (2018), the payoff of each agent depends on the
proportion of players who have already stopped, and the departure of players creates an
additional incentive for the players still in the game to leave as well. Both papers (Nutz
(2018) and Carmona et al. (2017)) adopt a purely probabilistic approach.
In contrast to these two references, Bertucci (2017) studies a MFG of optimal stopping,
which is similar to the one considered in this paper, i.e. where the interaction takes place
through the density of states of agents remaining in the game, rather than the proportion
of players that have already stopped. In this reference and in our paper, the departure
of players creates an incentive for the players still in the game to stay, a type of behavior
which is characteristic of resource-sharing problems. In Bertucci (2017) the state process has
constant coefficients and evolves in a bounded domain, and the MFG of optimal stopping is
solved through a coupled system of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman variational inequality and a
Fokker-Planck equation.
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Bertucci (2017) makes a number of significant contributions to the literature. In par-
ticular, he provides an example of non-existence of Nash equilibrium with pure strategies in
optimal stopping MFG, and introduces the notion of mixed strategies in this context, for
which existence may be recovered. However, the existence proofs in this paper are not fully
clear to us.1 To clarify the existence question and solve the MFG of optimal stopping prob-
lem in greater generality (with variable coefficients and in unbounded domains), we adopt,
in this paper, a completely different approach, based on the relaxed solution technique.
The approach of relaxed solutions/controls is a relatively popular method of compact-
ification of stochastic control problems to establish existence of solutions, which comes in
several different flavors. In, e.g., El Karoui, Huu Nguyen & Jeanblanc-Picque´ (1987) and
a number of other papers, the authors reformulate the control problem as a relaxed con-
trolled martingale problem. A similar approach is used by Lacker (2015) in the context of
(standard) MFG. In the second approach, especially popular for infinite-horizon and ergodic
control problems, the control problem is reformulated as a linear programming problem on
the space of measures, and one looks for the joint occupation density of the state process
and the control. We refer the reader to, e.g., Buckdahn, Goreac & Quincampoix (2011)
and Stockbridge et al. (1990), for a link between these two formulations. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first paper which uses relaxed solutions in order to solve optimal
stopping problems (both single-agent and of mean-field type).
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we present the model and
give the mean-field formulation of the problem. In Section 3, we introduce the relaxed
formulation of the single-agent optimal stopping problem and establish the existence of a
relaxed solution. In Section 4, we study the relaxed optimal stopping problem in the MFG
context and give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium value.
In Section 5, we establish the relation between the relaxed and strong formulation of both
single-agent and MFG of optimal stopping problems. Finally, in Section 6, we present the
numerical algorithm and provide convergence results.
2 The model
We fix a terminal time horizon T < ∞, and introduce a possibly unbounded open domain
O ⊆ R on which the state processes of the agents will evolve. The space of bounded positive
measures on O will be denoted by M(O), and the space of probability measures on O will
be denoted by P(O).
Consider n agents whose states X i, i = 1, . . . , n follow the diffusion-type dynamics
dX it = µ(t,X
i
t)dt+ σ(t,X
i
t)dW
i
t , X
i
0 = x
i ∈ O, (2.1)
where the Brownian motions W i, i = 1, . . . , n are independent and the coefficients µ and σ
satisfy the following assumption.
1To be precise, the weak convergence of the family mε established in the proof of existence of a mixed
solution in both stationary and parabolic cases (Theorems 1.6 for the stationary case and Theorem 2.1 for
the parabolic case) is not sufficient to conclude that
∫
f(mε)dmε converges.
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Assumption 1. The coefficients µ and σ are assumed to be Lipschitz continuous in the
second variable, uniformly in t ∈ [0, T ] and bounded.
By classical results on SDEs, this assumption guarantees the existence of a strong solution
to (2.1) satisfying
sup
0≤t≤T
E[(X it)p] <∞.
We denote by L the infinitesimal generator of this process
Lf(t, x) = µ(t, x)∂f
∂x
(t, x) +
σ2(t, x)
2
∂f 2
∂x2
(t, x).
Each agent aims to determine the optimal stopping time τi valued in [0, T ] by solving the
optimal stopping problem
max
τ
E
[∫ τ∧τ iO
0
e−ρtf˜(t,X it ,m
n
t )dt+ e
−ρ(τ∧τ iO∧T )g(τ ∧ τ iO ∧ T,X iτ∧τ iO∧T )
]
,
where ρ > 0 is a discount factor, f˜ : [0, T ]×O×M(O)→ R is the running reward function,
g : [0, T ]×O → R is the terminal reward, mnt is defined by
mnt (dx) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δXit (dx)1t≤τ∧τ iO ,
with τ a stopping time with respect to the filtration generated by the Brownian motions
of all agents, and τ iO the exit time from the domain O of agent i. The assumptions on f˜
will be specified later, and g is assumed to belong to C1,2([0, T ]×O) and has derivatives of
order 1 in t and of orders 1 and 2 in x of polynomial growth in x uniformly in t. Letting
f(t, x, µ) = e−ρt(f˜(t, x, µ)− ρg(t, x) + ∂g
∂t
+ Lg), the optimal stopping problem becomes (up
to a constant),
max
τ
E
[∫ τ∧τ iO
0
f(t,X it ,m
n
t )dt
]
.
MFG formulation In the limit of a large number of agents, we expect, from the law of
large numbers, that the empirical measure mnt converges to a deterministic limiting distri-
bution mt for each t ∈ [0, T ]. The problem of each agent therefore consists in finding the
optimal stopping time in the filtration generated by the individual noise of this agent only,
and it is sufficient to work on a probability space supporting a single Brownian motion.
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space supporting a standard Brownian motion W . We
denote by FW the natural filtration of W completed with the sets of measure zero. In
the MFG formulation, the state of the representative agent with initial value x follows the
dynamics
dXxt = µ(t,X
x
t )dt+ σ(t,X
x
t )dWt,
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where we write Xx· as a shorthand for X
(0,x)
· . As intimated in the introduction, the first
step of the MFG approach consists in solving the following optimal stopping problem for the
agent
max
τ∈T W ([0,T ])
E
[∫ τ∧τxO
0
f(t,Xxt ,mt)dt
]
, (2.2)
where T W ([0, T ]) is the set of FW -stopping times with values in [0, T ] and τxO ≡ τ (0,x)O is the
exit time from the domain O of this agent with initial value x. Then, given the optimal
stopping time (solution of the problem (2.2)) for the agent with initial condition x, τm,x, and
the initial measure m0 ∈ P(O), the second step consists in finding the family of distributions
(mt)0≤t≤T such that
mt(A) =
∫
m0(dx)P[Xxt ∈ A; τm,x ∧ τxO > t], A ∈ B(O), t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.3)
In other words, the solution of the optimal stopping MFG problem is the family of measures
(mt)0≤t≤T , which is the fixed point of the mapping defined by the right-hand side of (2.3).
In the sequel, such solution will be called a pure solution. As shown in Bertucci (2017), pure
solutions for optimal stopping MFG problems do not always exist, and for this reason in the
sequel we shall consider relaxed solutions. A relaxed solution is close in spirit to the mixed
solution introduced in Bertucci (2017), precise relationship between the two notions will be
established later in the paper.
3 Relaxed formulation of the single-agent optimal stop-
ping problem
The relaxed formulation of the optimal stopping problem consists in finding the occupation
measure of the representative agent rather than the stopping time. We first provide a relaxed
formulation of the standard optimal stopping problem in this section and then move to the
relaxed formulation of the MFG problem in the following one. First, we introduce the
necessary notations.
Let V be the space of families of positive bounded measures on O, (mt(·))0≤t≤T be such
that: for every t ∈ [0, T ], mt is a positive bounded measure on O, for every A ∈ B(O), the
mapping t 7→ mt(A) is measurable, and
∫ T
0
∫
Omt(dx) dt < ∞. To each family m ∈ V , we
associate a positive measure on [0, T ]×O defined by µ(dt, dx) := mt(dx) dt, and we endow V
with the topology of weak convergence of the associated measures. Since weak convergence
of probability measures is induced by the seminorms
m 7→
∣∣∣∣∫ fdm∣∣∣∣ ,
for f bounded and continuous, the space V is locally convex.
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Consider the optimal stopping problem
max
τ∈T W ([0,T ])
E
[∫ τ∧τxO
0
f(t,Xxt )dt
]
, (3.1)
where f is a measurable function with polynomial growth in x, uniformly in t.
Definition 3.1 (Relaxed optimal stopping problem). For a given initial distribution m∗0 ∈
P(O), the relaxed formulation of the optimal stopping problem (3.1) consists in finding the
family of measures (m∗t )0≤t≤T , which maximizes the cost functional∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x)mt(dx) dt, (3.2)
over all measure families mˆ ∈ A(m∗0), where the set A(m∗0) ⊆ V contains all families of
positive bounded measures (mˆt)0≤t≤T ∈ V satisfying∫
O
u(0, x)m∗0(dx) +
∫ T
0
∫
O
{
∂u
∂t
+ Lu
}
mˆt(dx) dt ≥ 0, (3.3)
for all u ∈ C1,2([0, T ]×O) such that u ≥ 0 and ∂u
∂t
+ Lu is bounded on [0, T ]×O.
The rest of this section is devoted to the solution of the relaxed optimal stopping prob-
lem. A precise connection with the strong (classical) formulation of this problem will
be established in Section 5. To gain some intuition about this definition right away, re-
mark that for a stopping time τ ∈ T W ([0, T ]), we can introduce the occupation measure
mxt (A) := E[1A(Xxt )1t≤τ∧τxO ]. Then the objective function of the optimal stopping problem
writes
E
[∫ τ∧τxO
0
f(t,Xxt )dt
]
=
∫
[0,T ]×O
f(t, y)mxt (dy) dt.
On the other hand, by Itoˆ’s formula, for a positive and regular test function u, one has
u(0, x) +
∫
[0,T ]×O
(
∂u
∂t
+ µ
∂u
∂x
+
1
2
σ2
∂2u
∂x2
)
(t, x)mt(dx) dt = E[u(τ ∧ τxO ∧ T,Xτ∧τxO∧T )] ≥ 0.
In Lemmas 3.2 and 3.4, we study the properties of the set A(m∗0). First note that this
set is clearly nonempty since it contains the family mt(dx) ≡ 0. To proceed, we need a
regularity assumption on the coefficients µ and σ. We distinguish two cases depending on
the type of boundary of O.
Assumption 2. The coefficients µ and σ are such that for every C∞ bounded function
g : [0, T ]×O → R, the equation(
∂u
∂t
+ Lu
)
(t, x) = g(t, x) (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×O, u(T, x) = 0, ∀x ∈ O,
has a C1,2 solution u on [0, T ]×O such that ∂u
∂x
has a polynomial growth in x, uniformly in
t, and such that one of the following two conditions holds:
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i. The boundary of O is inattainable: for all x ∈ O, τxO > T a.s.
ii. The solution u belongs to C([0, T ]×O) and satisfies u(t, x) = 0 for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×∂O.
Lemma 3.2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be satisfied. Fix m∗0 ∈ P(O).
i. Let g be a positive continuous function with polynomial growth. Then almost every-
where on t ∈ [0, T ], and for m ∈ A(m∗0),∫
O
g(x)mt(dx) ≤
∫
O
m∗0(dx)E[g(Xxt )1t<τxO ].
ii. Let g ∈ C2(O) such that g, g′ and g′′ are bounded. Then, for m ∈ A(m∗0) and for every
ψ ∈ C1([0, T ]), ∫ T
0
ψ′(t)
(∫
O
g(x)mt(dx)
)
dt ≤ C‖ψ‖∞,
for some C > 0.
Proof. Part i. Assume that f and g are C∞ bounded positive functions, and let u be the
solution of (
∂u
∂t
+ Lu
)
(t, x) = −g(x)f(t),
described in Assumption 2. By Itoˆ’s formula, for x ∈ O,
−u(t, x) =
∫ T∧τ (t,x)O
t
{
∂u
∂t
(s,X(t,x)s ) + Lu(s,X(t,x)s )
}
ds+
∫ T∧τ (t,x)O
t
∂u
∂x
(s,X(t,x)s )σ(s,X
(t,x)
s )dWs.
Taking the expectation and using the equation satisfied by u and the fact that ∂u
∂x
has
polynomial growth yields
u(t, x) = E
[∫ T∧τ (t,x)O
t
g(X(t,x)s )f(s)ds
]
,
which means that u is an admissible test function. Substituting the above expression for u
into the constraint, we have∫ T
0
f(t)
∫
O
E
[
g(Xxt )1t<τxO
]
m∗0(dx)dt ≥
∫ T
0
f(t)
∫
O
g(x)mt(dx)dt.
Since f is arbitrary, this implies that∫
O
m∗0(dx)E
[
g(Xxt )1t<τxO
] ≥ ∫
O
g(x)mt(dx),
t-almost everywhere on [0, T ]. The result may be extended to a positive continuous function
g with polynomial growth by approximation.
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Part ii. First remark that ∫
O
g(x)mt(dx),
is bounded on [0, T ]. This implies that it is enough to prove the result for ψ ∈ C∞([0, T ]),
because for ψ ∈ C1([0, T ]), the derivative ψ′ may be approximated by smooth functions in
the uniform norm.
By Itoˆ formula, for s ≤ τ (t,x)O ,
g(X(t,x)s ) = g(x) +
∫ s
t
g′(X(t,x)r )dX
(t,x)
r +
1
2
∫ s
t
g′′(X(t,x)r )σ
2(r,X(t,x)r )dr.
Taking the expectation and integrating by parts we obtain
E
[∫ T∧τ (t,x)O
t
g(X(t,x)s )ψ
′(s)ds
]
= E
[∫ T∧τ (t,x)O
t
g(x)ψ′(s)ds
]
+ E
[∫ T∧τ (t,x)O
t
ψ′(s)
∫ s
t
g′(X(t,x)r )µ(r,X
(t,x)
r )drds
]
+
1
2
E
[∫ T∧τ (t,x)O
t
ψ′(s)
∫ s
t
g′′(X(t,x)r )σ
2(r,X(t,x)r )drds
]
= g(x)E[ψ(T ∧ τ (t,x)O )− ψ(t)] + E
[∫ T∧τ (t,x)O
t
(ψ(T ∧ τ (t,x)O )− ψ(r))g′(X(t,x)r )µ(r,X(t,x)r )dr
]
+
1
2
E
[∫ T∧τ (t,x)O
t
(ψ(T ∧ τ (t,x)O )− ψ(r))g′′(X(t,x)r )σ2(r,X(t,x)r )dr
]
≤ C‖ψ‖∞,
for some constant C <∞, due to the bounds on g, its derivatives, and the coefficients of the
SDE. Then we can define the function
u(t, x) = E
[∫ T∧τ (t,x)O
t
g(X(t,x)s )ψ
′(s)ds
]
+ C‖ψ‖∞,
which is an admissible test function by the same argument as the one used in the first part.
This proves that ∫
O
u(0, x)m∗0(dx) ≥
∫ T
0
ψ′(t)
(∫
O
g(x)mt(dx)
)
dt,
and since u(0, x) ≤ 2C‖ψ‖∞ for all x ∈ O, we get the statement of the lemma.
Corollary 3.3. Under the assumptions of Lemma 3.2, let m∗0 ∈ P(O), and let m¯t(dx) be
the distribution of the process X started with initial distribution m∗0 and killed at the first
exit time from O. Then for every m ∈ A(m∗0), mt ≤ m¯t, t-almost everywhere on [0, T ]. In
particular, if m¯t has a density then mt does as well.
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Proof. Approximating the indicator function with a sequence of continuous bounded func-
tions and using the dominated convergence theorem, the first part of the above lemma yields
for all a, b ∈ O with a < b,
mt([a, b]) ≤
∫
[a,b]
∫
O
m∗0(dx)p¯
x(t, dz) = m¯t([a, b]),
where p¯x(t, dz) is the transition distribution of the process X killed at τxO.
In the following lemma we continue the study of the properties of the set A(m∗0).
Lemma 3.4. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied and let m∗0 ∈ P(O) satisfy∫
O
ln{1 + |x|}m∗0(dx) <∞. (3.4)
Then the set A(m∗0) is sequentially compact.
Proof. Let us first show the tightness of the associated set of measures on [0, T ]×O. Define
the function
φA(x) = ln
{
1 + |x|3
(
3x2
5A2
− 3|x|
2A
+ 1
)}
1|x|≤A + ln
{
1 +
A3
10
}
1|x|>A,
with A ≥ 0. Remark that
φ′A(x) =
3x2(1− |x|/A)2
1 + |x|3
(
3x2
5A2
− 3|x|
2A
+ 1
)sgnx1|x|≤A,
from which it is easy to see that φA is twice continuously differentiable on its entire domain,
and that the expressions φ′A(x), xφ
′
A(x), φ
′′
A(x) and x
2φ′′A(x) are bounded on O by a constant
independent from A. In addition, as A → ∞, φA(x) converges in a monotone fashion to
the limiting function φ∗(x) = ln{1 + |x|3}. Now, consider the test function uA(t, x) =
(T − t)φA(x). It follows that
T
∫
O
φA(x)m
∗
0(dx)−
∫ T
0
∫
O
φA(x)mt(dx) dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
O
(T − t)
{
µ(t, x)φ′A(x) +
σ2(t, x)
2
φ′′A(x)
}
mt(dx) dt ≥ 0,
for m ∈ A(m∗0). From the boundedness of µ and σ and the above observations, we deduce
that the expression within the brackets in the last term is bounded uniformly on A. The
limits of the first two terms, on the other hand, are computed by monotone convergence.
We conclude that there exists a constant C <∞ such that∫ T
0
∫
O
φ∗(x)µ(dt, dx) ≤ C + T
∫
O
φ∗(x)m∗0(dx),
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from which the tightness follows. Moreover, taking g = 1 in Lemma 3.2 we see that A(m∗0)
is uniformly bounded. Therefore, by Prokhorov’s theorem (Theorem 8.6.2 in Bogachev
(2007)), from any sequence of families of measures (mn)n≥1 ⊆ A(m∗0), one can extract a
subsequence, also denoted by (mn)n≥1, such that the sequence of associated measures on
[0, T ] × O, (µn)n≥1 converges weakly to a limiting measure µ∗. By weak convergence, the
measure µ∗ also satisfies the constraints of A(m∗0) i.e., for every test function u,∫
O
u(0, x)m∗0(dx) +
∫ T
0
∫
O
{
∂u
∂t
+ Lu
}
µ∗(dt, dx) ≥ 0.
Taking the test function u(t, x) =
∫ T
t
f(s)ds with f a positive continuous function, we have∫ T
0
f(t)dt
∫
O
m∗0(dx) ≥
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t)µ∗(dt, dx).
We conclude that µ∗ is a bounded measure and the measure
∫
O µ
∗(dt, dx) on [0, T ] is ab-
solutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, which means that we can write
µ∗(dt, dx) = m∗t (dx) dt for some m
∗ ∈ A(m∗0).
The following proposition is an existence result for the relaxed optimal stopping problem.
Proposition 3.5. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be satisfied and let m∗0 ∈ P(O) satisfy the
condition (3.4). Assume further that one of the following alternative conditions holds true:
i. The mapping (t, x) 7→ f(t, x) is continuous on [0, T ]×O and satisfies∫ T
0
∫
O
|f(t, x)|m¯t(dx) dt <∞,
where m¯t is the distribution at time t of the process X started with initial distribution
m∗0.
ii. The function f is of the form
f(t, x) =
n∑
i=1
f¯i(t)gi(x),
where n ≥ 1 and for each i, gi satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 3.2, part ii., and f¯i
is bounded measurable.
Then there exists m∗ ∈ A(m∗0) which maximizes the functional
m 7→
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x)mt(dx) dt,
over all m ∈ A(m∗0).
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Proof. Choose a maximizing sequence of families of measures (mn)n≥1⊆A(m∗0). By Lemma
3.4, it has a subsequence, also denoted by (mn)n≥1, which converges weakly to a limit m∗ ∈
A(m∗0). To show that m∗ is a maximizer of (3.2), we consider separately the two alternative
assumptions of the proposition.
Let Assumption i. hold true. Fix ε > 0. By the continuity of f and the integrability
assumption, there exists 0 ≤M <∞ such that∫
[0,T ]×O,f(t,x)>M
f(t, x)m¯t(dx) dt+
∫
[0,T ]×O,f(t,x)<−M
|f(t, x)|m¯t(dx) dt < ε.
Then, by weak convergence and by Corollary 3.3,
lim sup
n
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x)mnt (dx) dt ≤ ε+ lim sup
n
∫ T
0
∫
O
(M ∧ f(t, x)) ∨ (−M)mnt (dx)dt
= ε+
∫ T
0
∫
O
(M ∧ f(t, x)) ∨ (−M)m∗t (dx)dt
≤ 2ε+
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x)m∗t (dx)dt. (3.5)
Since ε is arbitrary, mn is a maximizing sequence and m∗ ∈ A(m∗0), this finishes the proof.
Suppose now that Assumption ii. holds true instead. Without loss of generality it is
enough to consider the case where n = 1, and we omit the index i. Consider the mapping
Gn : [0, T ] 7→ R defined by Gn(t) = ∫O g(x)mnt (dx). By Lemma 3.2 and Proposition 3.6
in Ambrosio, Fusco & Pallara (2000), Gn is then of bounded variation on [0, T ]. Then, by
Theorem 3.23 in the above reference, up to taking a subsequence, we may assume that the
sequence of mappings (Gn)n≥1 converges in L1([0, T ]) to some mapping G∗. On the other
hand, in view of the weak convergence, for any continuous function f : [0, T ] 7→ R,∫ T
0
f(t)Gn(t)dt→
∫ T
0
f(t)
∫
O
g(x)m∗t (dx)dt.
This shows that G∗(t) =
∫
O g(x)m
∗
t (dx). We conclude that∫ T
0
f¯(t)
∫
O
g(x)mnt (dx)dt→
∫ T
0
f¯(t)
∫
O
g(x)m∗t (dx)dt,
as n→∞.
4 Relaxed formulation of the optimal stopping MFG
problem
We now give the definition of the Nash equilibrium for the relaxed MFG optimal stopping
problem.
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Definition 4.1. Given the initial distribution m∗0, a family of measures m
∗ ∈ A(m∗0) is a
Nash equilibrium for the relaxed MFG optimal stopping problem (or “relaxed Nash equilib-
rium”) if ∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x,m∗t )mt(dx) dt ≤
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x,m∗t )m
∗
t (dx) dt,
for all m ∈ A(m∗0).
In other words, the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of fixed points of the
set-valued mapping Θ : A(m∗0)→ P(A(m∗0)), with P(A(m∗0)) the family of sets over A(m∗0),
defined by
Θ(m) = arg max
mˆ∈A(m∗0)
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x,mt)mˆt(dx) dt,
which is well defined whenever the function (t, x) 7→ f(t, x,mt) satisfies the conditions of
Proposition 3.5.
Theorem 4.2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be satisfied, let m∗0 ∈ P(O) satisfying (3.4), and
let the reward function f be of the form
f(t, x,m) =
K∑
i=1
f¯i
(
t,
∫
O
g¯i(x)mt(dx)
)
gi(x),
where, for each i, gi and g¯i satisfy the assumption of Lemma 3.2, part ii., and f¯i is bounded
measurable and continuous with respect to its second argument. Then there exists a Nash
equilibrium for the relaxed MFG problem.
Proof. We shall use the Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point theorem (Theorem 8.1.1 in McLennan
(2018)). We have seen that V is a locally convex space; moreover, the subset A(m∗0) ⊆ V is
compact (by Lemma 3.4 and since the topology of weak convergence is metrisable), convex
and nonempty. The mapping Θ is clearly convex. Therefore, to prove that it has a fixed
point it suffices to check that it is upper semicontinuous. In other words, we check that it
has a closed graph (see Proposition 5.1.3 in McLennan (2018)), where the graph is defined
by
Gr(Θ) = {(m, m¯) ∈ (A(m∗0))2 : m ∈ Θ(m¯)}.
To show that Gr(Θ) is closed it suffices to check that for any two sequences (mn)n≥1 ⊆ A(m∗0)
and (m¯n)n≥1 ⊆ A(m∗0) which converge weakly to m ∈ A(m∗0) and m¯ ∈ A(m∗0) respectively,
and such that ∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x, m¯nt )m
n
t (dx) dt ≥
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x, m¯nt )mˆt(dx) dt,
for every mˆ ∈ A(m∗0), we have∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x, m¯t)mt(dx) dt ≥
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x, m¯t)mˆt(dx) dt,
13
for every mˆ ∈ A(m∗0). To prove this, it is enough to show that, up to taking a subsequence,∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x, m¯t)mt(dx) dt = lim
n
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x, m¯nt )m
n
t (dx) dt, (4.1)
and ∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x, m¯t)mˆt(dx) dt = lim
n
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x, m¯nt )mˆt(dx) dt. (4.2)
We will only show that (4.1) holds true, since the convergence given by (4.2) follows by the
same arguments. It is enough to consider the case K = 1 and we drop the index i. We
therefore need to prove∫ T
0
f¯(t, g¯ ∗ m¯t) g ∗mt dt = lim
n
∫ T
0
f¯(t, g¯ ∗ m¯nt ) g ∗mnt dt, (4.3)
where we write g ∗m as a shorthand for ∫O g(x)m(dx). As in the proof of Proposition 3.5,
we may show that g¯ ∗m¯n converges to g¯ ∗m¯ in L1([0, T ]). Similarly, we may show that g ∗mn
converges to g ∗m in L1([0, T ]). Since f is continuous, f¯(t, g¯ ∗ m¯nt ) g ∗mnt converges almost
everywhere to f¯(t, g¯ ∗ m¯t) g ∗mt. Further, by Corollary 3.3, g ∗mnt is uniformly bounded,
and (4.3) follows from the dominated convergence theorem.
Uniqueness of the Nash value for the relaxed MFG problem We prove here the
uniqueness result of the Nash equilibrium value for the relaxed problem, which holds under
the following assumption on the map f .
Assumption 3. The function f takes the following form
f(t, x,m) = g(x)f¯
(
t,
∫
O
g(x)mt(dx)
)
+ h(t, x),
where g satisfies the assumption of Lemma 3.2, part ii., h : [0, T ] × O 7→ R is continuous,
with polynomial growth in x and f¯ : [0, T ]×R 7→ R is bounded measurable, continuous and
decreasing in the second argument.
Remark 4.3. Note that under Assumption 3, the function f satisfies for each t and all
m1 ∈ A(m∗0) and m2 ∈ A(m∗0) the following antimonotonicity condition∫
O
(
f(t, x,m1t )− f(t, x,m2t )
) (
m1t (dx)−m2t (dx)
)
= (f¯(t, g ∗m1t )− f¯(t, g ∗m2t ))(g ∗m1t − g ∗m2t ) ≤ 0.
Theorem 4.4 (Uniqueness of the Nash value). Let m∗ and m¯ be two Nash equilibria
for the relaxed problem and let Assumption 3 be satisfied. Then,
f¯(t, g ∗m∗t ) = f¯(t, g ∗ m¯t),
almost everywhere on [0, T ], and in particular they lead to the same value of the relaxed
fixed point problem, that is
∫ T
0
∫
O f(t, x,m
∗)m∗t (dx) =
∫ T
0
∫
O f(t, x, m¯)m¯t(dx).
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Proof. Since m∗ is a Nash equilibrium, we get that∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x,m∗)m¯t(dx) ≤
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x,m∗)m∗t (dx)dt.
Since m¯ is also a Nash equilibrium, we obtain∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x, m¯)m∗t (dx)dt ≤
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x, m¯)m¯t(dx)dt.
From the two above inequalities, we derive that∫ T
0
∫
O
(f(t, x, m¯)− f(t, x,m∗))(m¯t(dx)−m∗t (dx))dt ≥ 0.
The antimonotonicity property of the map f then implies that∫
O
(f(t, x, m¯)− f(t, x,m∗))(m¯t(dx)−m∗t (dx)) = 0,
almost everywhere on [0, T ], or in other words that
(f¯(t, g ∗m1t )− f¯(t, g ∗m2t ))(g ∗m1t − g ∗m2t ) = 0,
almost everywhere on [0, T ], which implies that
f¯(t, g ∗m1t ) = f¯(t, g ∗m2t ),
almost everywhere on [0, T ]. Integrating over [0, T ]×O we see that the two equilibria lead
to the same value.
Potential games We now give an example where the search for MFG equilibrium reduces
to the maximization of a functional.
Proposition 4.5. Let the reward function be of the form
f(t, x,m) =
K∑
i=1
f¯i (t, gi ∗mt) gi(x),
where for each i, f¯i is bounded, measurable in t, and continuous and decreasing in the second
argument, and gi satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 3.2, part ii. Then m
∗ ∈ A(m∗0) is a
Nash equilibrium of the relaxed optimal stopping problem if and only if
F (m∗) = sup
m∈A(m∗0)
F (m),
where
F (m) =
K∑
i=1
∫ T
0
F i(t, g ∗mt)dt,
and for each i, F i is such that ∂xF i(t, x) = f¯i(t, x) and F i(·, 0) ∈ L1([0, T ]).
15
Proof. Assume that m∗ is a Nash equilibrium. By definition we then have∫ T
0
∑
i
∂xF i(t, g ∗m∗t )(g ∗mt − g ∗m∗t )dt ≤ 0.
Since f¯i is decreasing in the second argument, F¯i is concave in the second argument, and by
concavity this implies that F (m∗) ≥ F (m). Conversely, assume that m∗ is a maximizer of
F . For every α ∈ [0, 1] and every m ∈ A(m∗0), then,
K∑
i=1
∫ T
0
{
F i(t, g ∗m∗t )− F i(t, αg ∗mt + (1− α)g ∗m∗t )
}
dt ≥ 0,
which implies that
K∑
i=1
∫ T
0
∂xF i(t, ξt)g ∗ (m∗t −mt)dt ≥ 0,
where ξt ∈ [g ∗m∗t , αg ∗mt + (1− α)g ∗m∗t ]. Making α tend to 0 and using the dominated
convergence theorem, we conclude that
K∑
i=1
∫ T
0
f¯i(t, g ∗m∗t )g ∗ (m∗t −mt)dt ≥ 0.
5 Relation between the relaxed and the strong formu-
lation of the single-agent optimal stopping and of the
MFG problem
In this section we provide the relation between the relaxed and the strong formulation of
the single-agent optimal stopping problem and of the MFG problem. We make here the
following additional assumption.
Assumption 4.
i. The domain O is an open bounded interval of R and the process Xx· killed at τxO has a
distribution m¯t, which, for each t, has a square integrable density with respect to the
Lebesgue measure.
ii. σ satisfies the uniform ellipticity condition.
Note that, by Corollary 3.3, we derive that mt admits a square integrable density with
respect to the Lebesgue measure, for each m ∈ A(m∗0) and for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ].
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Let W be a standard Brownian motion and X0 be a random variable with distribution
m∗0, independent from W . We suppose that X0 is valued in O and that m∗0 admits a square
integrable density with respect to the Lebesgue measure. In the sequel, we denote by F the
filtration given by Ft = σ(Ws, 0 ≤ s ≤ t) ∨ σ(X0) ∨ N , where N denotes the sets of zero
measure. Moreover, T ([t, T ]) denotes the set of stopping times with respect to this filtration
with values in [t, T ].
We address first the case of the single-agent optimal stopping problem and we suppose
that the instantaneous reward funtion f satisfies one of the assumptions of Proposition 3.5.
Theorem 5.1. [Single-Agent optimal stopping problem] Let v be the value function
of the following optimal stopping problem
v(t, x) = sup
τ∈T W ([t,T ])
E
[∫ τ∧τ (t,x)O
t
f(s,X(t,x)s )ds
]
, (5.1)
with (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R and τ (t,x)O := inf{s ≥ t : X(t,x)s /∈ O}. We have
i.
∫
O v(0, x)m
∗
0(dx) = sup
m∈A(m∗0)
∫ T
0
∫
O f(s, x)ms(dx)ds.
ii. Let x ∈ O and define τ¯x := inf{0 ≤ s ≤ T : v(s,Xxs ) = 0}. Then the measure m∗ given
by m∗t (A) :=
∫
Om
∗
0(dx)P[Xxt ∈ A, t < τ¯x] for all A ∈ B(O) is a maximizer of the map
m ∈ A(m∗0) 7→
∫ T
0
∫
O f(s, x)ms(dx)ds.
iii. Let m¯ be a maximizer of the mapm ∈ A(m∗0) 7→
∫ T
0
∫
O f(s, x)ms(dx)ds. Then it satisfies:
a.
∫
S f(t, x)m¯t(dx)dt = 0, with S := {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×O : v(t, x) = 0}.
b. For all C∞c functions φ such that suppφ ⊆ {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×O : v > 0}, the following
holds ∫ T
0
∫
O
{
∂φ
∂t
+ Lφ
}
m¯t(dx)dt+
∫
O
φ(0, x)m∗0(dx) = 0. (5.2)
Proof. Part i. By Theorem 4.7, Chapter 3, in Bensoussan & Lions (1982), the value function
defined by (5.1) is the unique solution belonging to W 2,1,2(Q), with Q := (0, T )×O 2, which
satisfies the following variational inequality
min
(
− ∂v
∂t
(t, x)− Lv(t, x)− f(t, x), v(t, x)
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ (0, T )×O,
v(t, x) = 0, t ∈ (0, T ), x ∈ ∂O,
v(T, x) = 0, x ∈ O. (5.3)
2The Sobolev space W 2,1,2(Q) represents the set of functions u such that ∂tu, ∂xu, ∂xxu ∈ L2(Q), where
the derivatives are understood in the sense of distributions.
17
First note that, by Lemma A.1, we have
v(0, X0) = esssup
τ∈T ([0,T ])
E
[∫ τ∧τX0O
0
f(s,XX0s )ds|F0
]
a.s. (5.4)
By classical results on optimal stopping and associated reflected Backward SDEs with ran-
dom terminal time T ∧ τX0O (see e.g. Proposition 2.3 in El Karoui, Kapoudjian, Pardoux,
Peng, Quenez et al. (1997)), we get
v(0, X0) = E
[∫ τ¯X0
0
f(s,XX0s )ds|F0
]
a.s. , (5.5)
where
τ¯X0 := inf{0 ≤ t ≤ T : v(t,XX0t ) = 0}. (5.6)
Note that, by definition of the value function v, we have τ¯X0 ≤ τX0O ∧ T a.s.
Taking now the expectation in (5.5), we derive that
E[v(0, X0)] = E
[∫ τ¯X0
0
f(s,XX0s )ds
]
.
Remark that the occupational measure associated with the diffusion process X· killed at
the stopping time τ¯X0 , that is mt(A) :=
∫
Om
∗
0(dx)P[Xxt ∈ A, t < τ¯x], belongs to A(m∗0).
Therefore, we have ∫
O
v(0, x)m∗0(dx) ≤ sup
m∈A(m∗0)
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(s, x)ms(dx)ds.
We now show the converse inequality. Fix m ∈ A(m∗0). Using a classical method of
regularisation by convolution with a standard mollifier, with respect to both time and space
(see, e.g., an extension of Meyers-Serrin’s result - Theorem 3, p. 252, in Evans (1998)), the
value function v can be approximated by a sequence of functions ϕn ∈ C∞([0, T ] × O,R+)
such that ϕn → v in W 2,1,2(Q) ∩ C([0, T ], L2(O)) as n → ∞ and ∂tϕn + Lϕn is bounded.
Since (ϕn)n≥1 are admissible test functions, they verify the constraint (3.3). Therefore, using
the assumptions on m and passing to the limit, we derive that the value function v satisfies∫
O
v(0, x)m∗0(dx) +
∫ T
0
∫
O
{
∂v
∂t
+ Lv
}
mt(dx)dt ≥ 0. (5.7)
From the above inequality, we derive that∫
O
v(0, x)m∗0(dx) ≥ −
∫ T
0
∫
O
{
∂v
∂t
+ Lv
}
mt(dx)dt. (5.8)
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Since v satisfies the variational inequality (5.3) and due to the positivity ofm and Assumption
4, we get
−
∫ T
0
∫
O
{
∂v
∂t
+ Lv
}
mt(dx)dt ≥
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x)mt(dx)dt.
Combining the two above relations and by arbitrariness of m ∈ A(m∗0), we get∫
O
v(0, x)m∗0(dx) ≥ sup
m∈A(m∗0)
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x)mt(dx)dt.
Part ii. Since the stopping time τ¯X0 given by (5.6) is optimal for the stopping problem
(5.4), we derive that ∫
O
v(0, x)m∗0(dx) =
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x)m∗t (dx)dt, (5.9)
with m∗ defined by m∗t (A) :=
∫
Om
∗
0(dx)P[Xxt ∈ A, t < τ¯x] for all A ∈ B(O).
Using part i. and the fact that m∗ ∈ A(m∗0), the result follows.
Part iii. Let m∗ be defined in part ii. Since by the results above it is a maximizer, we
have
∫ T
0
∫
O f(t, x)m¯t(dx)dt =
∫ T
0
∫
O f(t, x)m
∗
t (dx)dt. Therefore
0 =
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x)
(
m¯t(dx)−m∗t (dx)
)
dt
=
∫
v>0
f(t, x)m¯t(dx)dt+
∫
v=0
f(t, x)m¯t(dx)dt−
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x)m∗t (dx)dt
=
∫
v>0
(
− ∂v
∂t
− Lv
)
m¯t(dx)dt−
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x)m∗t (dx)dt+
∫
v=0
f(t, x)m¯t(dx)dt,
where the last relation follows since v satisfies the variational inequality (5.3). Now, since
−∂v
∂t
− Lv = 0 a.e. on {v = 0} and m∗ satisfies (5.9), we get
0 =
∫ T
0
∫
O
(
− ∂v
∂t
− Lv
)
m¯t(dx)dt−
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(t, x)m∗t (dx)dt+
∫
v=0
f(t, x)m¯t(dx)dt
=
∫ T
0
∫
O
(
− ∂v
∂t
− Lv
)
m¯t(dx)dt−
∫
O
v(0, x)m∗0(dx) +
∫
v=0
f(t, x)m¯t(dx)dt.
Using the above relation, the inequality (5.8) and the fact that f ≤ 0 a.e. on {v = 0}, we
finally obtain that ∫
v=0
f(t, x)m¯t(dx)dt = 0,
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and ∫ T
0
∫
O
(
∂v
∂t
+ Lv
)
m¯t(dx)dt+
∫
O
v(0, x)m∗0(dx) = 0. (5.10)
Let us now show that (5.10) implies that∫ T
0
∫
O
{
∂φ
∂t
+ Lφ
}
m¯t(dx)dt+
∫
O
φ(0, x)m∗0(dx) = 0,
for all C∞c functions φ such that suppφ⊆{(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×O : v > 0}.
First note that, by the same approximation procedure as the one used for the value
function v, any non-negative function u in W 2,1,2(Q) satisfies the constraint (5.7).
Let φ be a C∞c non-negative function such that suppφ ⊆ {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × O : v > 0}.
Up to an appropriate scale factor, one can assume that φ ≤ v. Suppose that∫ T
0
∫
O
{
∂φ
∂t
+ Lφ
}
m¯t(dx)dt+
∫
O
φ(0, x)m∗0(dx) > 0. (5.11)
Subtracting (5.11) from (5.10), we obtain that∫ T
0
∫
O
{
∂(v − φ)
∂t
+ L(v − φ)
}
m¯t(dx)dt+
∫
O
(v − φ)(0, x)m∗0(dx) < 0,
Since v − φ is a non-negative function belonging to W 2,1,2(Q), we get a contradiction. This
implies that for all non-negative C∞c functions φ such that suppφ ⊆ {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × O :
v > 0} we have ∫ T
0
∫
O
{
∂φ
∂t
+ Lφ
}
m¯t(dx)dt+
∫
O
φ(0, x)m∗0(dx) = 0.
The result can be extended to an arbitrary C∞c function φ (which also takes negative values)
such that suppφ ⊆ {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×O : v > 0}. Using appropriate scaling factors and simi-
lar arguments as above, one can show that
∫ T
0
∫
O
{
∂φ
∂t
+ Lφ} m¯t(dx)dt+∫O φ(0, x)m∗0(dx) < 0
and
∫ T
0
∫
O
{
∂φ
∂t
+ Lφ} m¯t(dx)dt + ∫O φ(0, x)m∗0(dx) > 0 cannot be satisfied. Hence, for all
C∞c functions φ such that suppφ ⊆ {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×O : v > 0}, we have∫ T
0
∫
O
{
∂φ
∂t
+ Lφ
}
m¯t(dx)dt+
∫
O
φ(0, x)m∗0(dx) = 0. (5.12)
We now illustrate the relation between the relaxed and strong formulation of the opti-
mization problem in the MFG context. We suppose that the instantaneous reward funtion
f satisfies Assumption 3 with h ≡ 0.
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Theorem 5.2. [MFG optimal stopping problem] Let m∗ be a Nash equilibrium of the
relaxed MFG problem and let v be the value function of the optimal stopping problem
v(t, x) = sup
τ∈T W ([t,T ])
E
[∫ τ∧τ (t,x)O
t
f(s,X(t,x)s ,m
∗
s)ds
]
,
with (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R and τ (t,x)O := inf{s ≥ t : X(t,x)s /∈ O}.
We have
i.
∫
O v(0, x)m
∗
0(dx) =
∫ T
0
∫
O f(s, x,m
∗
s)m
∗
s(dx)ds.
ii. m∗ satisfies
a.
∫
S f(t, x,m
∗
t )m
∗
t (dx)dt = 0, with S := {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×O : v(t, x) = 0}.
b. For all C∞c functions φ such that suppφ ⊆ {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×O : v > 0}, the following
holds ∫ T
0
∫
O
{
∂φ
∂t
+ Lφ
}
m∗t (dx)dt+
∫
O
φ(0, x)m∗0(dx) = 0.
Proof. The proof follows by using the results obtained in Theorem 5.1 applied to the instan-
taneous reward function f(·,m∗) (which satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 3.5, part ii,
so that Theorem 5.1 can be applied), together with the Nash equilibria property of m∗.
Remark 5.3. It follows from the variational inequality that f ≤ 0 on {v = 0}. Therefore, if
f 6= 0 on {v = 0}, ∫{v=0}m∗t (dx) dt = 0. Such a solution is called a pure solution in Bertucci
(2017), meaning that the agent will exit the game immediately upon entering the exercise
region.
6 Fixed-point algorithm and convergence
We propose here a fixed-point algorithm for potential games. In this section, we use the no-
tations of Proposition 4.5 and we suppose that Assumption 3 (with h ≡ 0) and Assumption
4, as well as the assumptions of Proposition 4.5 are in force.
Algorithm
• Fix m0 ∈ A(m∗0);
• For k = 0 to N
• Compute uk the solution of the obstacle problem (5.3) associated with f(·,mk);
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• Let m˜k ∈ A(m∗0) be such that m˜kt (A) =
∫
Om
∗
0(dx)P[Xxt ∈ A; t < τxk ], for all
A ∈ B(O), where τxk := inf{0 ≤ t ≤ T : uk(t,Xxt ) = 0}3;
• Let ρk be a maximizer of ρ 7→ F (mk + ρ(m˜k −mk));
• Set mk+1 := mk + ρk(m˜k −mk);
• Set k ← k + 1.
In the above algorithm, N represents the number of iterations.
For each m ∈ A(m∗0), define
C(m) :=
{
m+ ρˆ(m∗ −m), m∗ ∈ arg max
m′∈A(m∗0)
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(mt)m
′
t(dx)dt,
ρˆ ∈ arg max
ρ∈[0,1]
F (m+ ρ(m∗ −m))
}
.
Lemma 6.1. The set-valued map m ∈ A(m∗0) 7→ C(m) has a closed graph and m¯ ∈ A(m∗0)
is a relaxed Nash equilibrium if and only if it satisfies m¯ ∈ C(m¯).
Proof. Let (mn)n≥1 ∈ A(m∗0) be a sequence converging weakly to some mˆ ∈ A(m∗0) and
m¯n = mn+ ρˆn(mn
∗−mn) such that m¯n ∈ C(mn) weakly converging to some m¯. Let us prove
that m¯ ∈ C(mˆ). Taking subsequences if necessary, we can assume that ρˆn converges to some
ρˆ ∈ [0, 1] and mn∗ weakly converges to some m∗.
Since mn
∗
maximizes the map m 7→ ∫ T
0
∫
O f(m
n
t )mt(dx)dt, we get that∫ T
0
∫
O
f(mnt )m
n∗
t (dx)dt ≥
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(mnt )mt(dx)dt,
for all m ∈ A(m∗0). For simplicity, we consider here the case K = 1 and drop the index i.
Using the same arguments as those in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we may say that, up to
taking subsequences, the sequence (g ∗mn)n≥1 (resp. (g ∗mn∗)n≥1) converges in L1([0, T ])
to g ∗ mˆ (resp. g ∗ m∗). Due to the continuity of f¯ , we derive that f¯(t, g ∗ mnt )g ∗ mn∗t
(resp. f¯(t, g ∗mnt )g ∗mt) converges for a.e. t to f¯(t, g ∗ mˆt)g ∗m∗t (resp. f¯(t, g ∗ mˆt)g ∗mt).
By Corollary 3.3, g ∗mn∗ is uniformly bounded, therefore, by appealing to the dominated
convergence theorem, we derive∫ T
0
∫
O
f(mˆt)m
∗
t (dx)dt ≥
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(mˆt)mt(dx)dt,
for all m ∈ A(m∗0), that is
m∗ ∈ arg max
m∈A(m∗0)
∫ T
0
∫
O
f(mˆt)mt(dx)dt.
3Note that, for each k from 0 to N , we extend uk such that uk(t, x) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and x /∈ O.
Therefore, we have τxk ≤ τxO ∧ T a.s.
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Now it remains to show that ρˆ is a maximizer of ρ 7→ F (mˆ + ρ(m∗ − mˆ)). For each n, we
have F (mn + ρˆn(mn
∗ −mn)) ≥ F (mn + ρ(mn∗ −mn)), for all ρ ∈ [0, 1], for all n. Taking the
limit n→∞ and using similar arguments as above, as well as the assumptions on F , we get
F (mˆ+ ρˆ(m∗ − mˆ)) ≥ F (mˆ+ ρ(m∗ − mˆ)), for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
To conclude, we have m¯ ∈ C(mˆ).
It is clear that, if m ∈ A(m∗0) is a relaxed Nash equilibrium, then it satisfies m ∈
C(m). Conversely, one can show that if m ∈ C(m), then m corresponds to a relaxed
Nash equilibrium. Indeed, if m ∈ C(m), then we have ρˆ = 0 or m∗ = m. If ρˆ = 0,
then
∫ T
0
∫
O f(mt)(m
∗
t (dx) − mt(dx))dt ≤ 0. Since m∗ is a maximizer of the map m′ 7→∫ T
0
∫
O f(mt)m
′
t(dx)dt, we derive that
∫ T
0
∫
O f(mt)(m
∗
t (dx) − mt(dx))dt = 0, which implies
that m corresponds to a relaxed Nash equilibrium. If m∗ = m, the conclusion is clear.
We now give the following convergence result.
Theorem 6.2. The cluster points of the sequence (mn)n≥1 generated by the previous algo-
rithm belong to the set of relaxed Nash equilibria and the sequence (un(0, x))n≥1 converges
for all x ∈ O to u¯(0, x), the value function of the obstacle problem associated with cost
functional f(·, m¯), where m¯ is a relaxed Nash equilibrium.
Proof. First note that, by using the definition of m˜n and Theorem 5.1 part ii., we get that
m˜n ∈ arg max
m′∈A(m∗0)
∫ T
0
∫
O f(m
n
t )m
′
t(dx)dt. We thus have m
n+1 ∈ C(mn), for all n.
Let (mkn)n≥1 be a sequence converging weakly to some m, and taking a subsequence
again if necessary, we may also assume that mkn+1 converges to some m1. As by the previous
theorem the set-valued map m ∈ A(m∗0) 7→ C(m) has a closed graph, we have m1 ∈ C(m),
that ism1 = m+ρˆ(m
∗−m), withm∗ ∈ arg max
m′∈A(m∗0)
∫ T
0
∫
O f(mt)m
′
t(dx)dt and ρˆ ∈ arg max
ρ∈[0,1]
F (m+
ρ(m∗ −m)).
Now, since the sequence (F (mn))n≥1 is increasing, one has F (m) = F (m1). Assume now
that m is not a Nash equilibrium, that is m /∈ arg max
m′∈A(m∗0)
∫ T
0
∫
O f(mt)m
′
t(dx)dt. Therefore,∫ T
0
∫
O f(mt)(m
∗
t (dx) − mt(dx))dt > 0. Moreover, using Lemma 6.1, we have m /∈ C(m)
which implies that ρˆ > 0. Hence, we conclude that F (m1) = F (m + ρˆ(m
∗ −m)) > F (m),
which represents a contradiction.
Let us now prove the convergence of the sequence (un(0, x))n≥1 for all x ∈ O.
Since all Nash equilibria m lead to the same value (see Theorem 4.4), we can define
u¯ as being the solution of the obstacle problem associated with f(·, m¯), with m¯ a Nash
equilibrium.
Let ukn be a given subsequence. Up to subtracting a subsequence again, one can assume
that mkn converges weakly to some m∗ ∈ A(m∗0), which, by the results above, is a relaxed
Nash equilibrium.
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Fix x ∈ O. We have:
|ukn(0, x)− u¯(0, x)| ≤ sup
τ∈T W ([0,T ])
E
[∫ τ∧τxO
0
∣∣f(s,Xxs ,mkns )− f(s,Xxs ,m∗s)∣∣ ds]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
∣∣f(s,Xxs ,mkns )− f(s,Xxs ,m∗s)∣∣ ds] .
Using again the convergence in L1([0, T ]) of g ∗mkn to g ∗m∗, the assumptions on f together
with Lebesgue Theorem, we get that the last term of the above inequality converges to 0. We
can conclude that from every subsequence of ukn(0, x), we can extract a further subsequence
which converges to u¯(0, x). The result follows.
A Appendix
We show here that the representation (5.1) remains true when the initial condition ξ is
random. More precisely, we have the following result.
Lemma A.1. Let ξ ∈ L2(O,F0). Then we have
v(0, ξ) = esssup
τ∈T ([0,T ])
E
[∫ τ∧τξO
0
f(s,Xξs )ds|F0
]
a.s. (A.1)
Proof. The proof is based on quite classical arguments and we give it here for the reader’s
convenience. Let us first consider a simple random variable ξn ∈ L2(O,F0), being such that
there exists n ∈ N, A1, A2, ..., An ∈ F0 and x1, x2, ..., xn ∈ O such that
ξn =
n∑
i=1
xi1Ai a.s. (A.2)
By using the definitions of ξn and v(t, x), we obtain
esssup
τ∈T ([0,T ])
E
[∫ τ∧τξnO
0
f(s,Xξ
n
s )ds|F0
]
=
n∑
i=1
1Ai sup
τ∈T W ([0,T ])
E
[∫ τ∧τxiO
0
f(s,Xxis )ds
]
=
n∑
i=1
1Aiv(0, xi) = v(0, ξ
n) a.s.
Now, in the general case, we approximate ξ by a sequence of simple random variables ξn of
the form given by (A.2). The continuity of v with respect to x implies that
v(0, ξn)→v(0, ξ) a.s. as n→∞. (A.3)
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We have∣∣∣∣∣ esssupτ∈T ([0,T ]) E
[∫ τ∧τξnO
0
f(s,Xξ
n
s )ds|F0
]
− esssup
τ∈T ([0,T ])
E
[∫ τ∧τξO
0
f(s,Xξs )ds|F0
]∣∣∣∣∣
≤ E
[∫ τξO∧τξnO
0
∣∣f(s,Xξns )− f(s,Xξs )∣∣ ds|F0
]
+ E
[∫ τξnO
τξ
n
O ∧τξO
|f(s,Xξns )|ds|F0
]
+ E
[∫ τξO
τξ
n
O ∧τξO
|f(s,Xξs )|ds|F0
]
a.s.
Since ξn→ξ a.s. as n→∞, we get that τ ξnO →τ ξO a.s. as n→∞ due to the continuity property of
the first passage time for elliptic diffusions (see Proposition 4.4. in Pardoux (1998)). Using
the continuity property of the solution of the SDE with respect to the initial condition,
together with the assumptions on f and Lebesgue Theorem, it follows that
v(0, ξn)→ esssup
τ∈T ([0,T ])
E
[∫ τ∧τξO
0
f(s,Xξs )ds|F0
]
a.s as n→∞. (A.4)
By (A.3) and (A.4) and the uniqueness of the limit, we get (A.1).
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